What is a Doctrine?
Theoretically doctrine means a rule or principle that forms the basis of a
theory or policy. In other words doctrine is the set of principles or rules governing the
employment of a capability. There is a passive use of this concept in political, military
and strategic aspects. Political and ideological doctrines encompass practice and
promulgation of a political philosophy. When the word doctrine is implemented in
military matters it stands for the environment within which armed forces operate.
This word also extends to prescribe the methods and circumstances within which
army should be employed (Viotti, 1999; 190).
What is a Nuclear Doctrine?
Nuclear doctrines of the contemporary world are different from the rest of
the classical doctrines. After having nuclear capability, two things which a state had to
address, first thing is to efficient deployment and second is management of these
nuclear weapons. To tackle all these and related issues, every state needs to develop a
doctrine that pertains under what circumstances, how, and for what purposes such
weapons will be used. Second thing in this issue is the need to have a foolproof
command and control to ensure specific use according to the plans mentioned in the
nuclear doctrine. Proper and efficient command and control system may be used as a
deterrent purpose while unauthorised or accidental use may result in chaos for the
mankind and humanity (Bhumitra Chakma, 2006).
The nuclear doctrines are mainly of two basic types; aggressive or offensive
nuclear doctrine, non aggressive or defensive nuclear doctrine. It defines principles
and policies about the development, deployment and employment of nuclear forces.
A doctrine is a guideline for the policy makers and decision makers. The definition of
a nuclear doctrine actually elaborates the qualities of a perfect doctrine. A complete
doctrine must be able to provide guideline for the policy makers and direction for the
arms forces for the deployment and employment of the nuclear forces (Freedman,
2003; 45-69).
Amir Latif
While discussing Pakistan and India’s nuclear doctrine it will be analyzed
whether these doctrines fulfill the required qualities and what implication they do
have on both countries in general and the region in particular. It is essential to analyze
them as the changing global scenario demands for the clear picture of the nuclear
posture of both paramount states of the South Asian region. This region casts its
impact not only on the residing actors but the neighboring region as well.
Evolution of Indian Nuclear Program
India’s first attempts to begin nuclear program published by Guarav Kampani
in Nuclear Overview: Historical Overview identifies as “India’s nuclear program was
conceived in the pre-independence era by a small group of influential scientists who
grasped the significance of nuclear energy and persuaded political leaders from the
Indian National Congress to invest resources in the nuclear sector” (Guarav
Kampani, 2007). A chief promoter regarding this program was Dr. Homi Jehanjir
Bhabba, and he forwarded his proposals to Sir Dorab Tata Trust to initiate a research
institute in the area of nuclear technology. His logic to shift to the nuclear energy was
that when nuclear energy will be utilized with success for power and production
purposes, India will not dependent of foreign experts after a couple of decades from
now”(George Perkovich, 1999).
During this debate related to nuclear technology the country quietly shifted
from uranium based production to plutonium based one. Initianly this shift was
because of shortage of natural uranium and so much so that plutonium case be used
as doubly beneficial as first stage and second stage fuel (unending) with the help of
India’s first reactor, the 1MW Aspara Research Reactor, a reactor that was built with
British help in 1955. Canada agreed to provide the 40MW Canada-India Reactor
(CIR) after long deliberations (as first step). (M.V. Ramana, 2007).
As far as the India is concerned India followed Nehru’s declared “peaceful
nuclear program,” in the 1950s and 1960s, with an agenda that they will not develop
nuclear weapons, but will only utilize this form of energy as to provide energy for the
public, but there were some indicators that some key figures in India’s nuclear
program thought differently.
Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, Vol. 2(1), June 2014
Phase 1964- 1974 (China Dimension)
Evolution of the Indian nuclear weapon program traces back to its inception.
As it is discussed earlier India had mature nuclear thoughts in 50s. China-India
conflict added a serious dimension in it. There were serious discussions on the
acquisition of nuclear capability on intellectual, official and professional level. In 1964
China had done its first atomic explosion. This incident induced a surge of tension
throughout India. Dr. Bhabha openly expressed the possibility of the development of
Indian nuclear weapon at the occasion of 12th Pugwash conference. He openly and
vividly suggested ‘recourse to nuclear weapons to redress the imbalance against the
China’s military dominance.’ That was the stage when India was in need of a decade
or more for the development of a nuclear weapon but Dr. Bhabha was of the view
that it could be made possible in the span of one and a half year. Although it was a
boasted and a lofty claim yet it showed the urgency on Indian side for the acquisition
of nuclear weapon.
As compare to China India’s nuclear program is predated. India had
developed CIRUS and TRP, which offer the essential facilities of developing a nuclear
weapon, before the Chinese atomic explosion in 1964. Incidents did not stop here.
Next jolt was felt severely when Chine gave ultimatum to India during the Pak- India
war of 1965. This incident actually refueled nuclear weapon debate in India. Indian
Prime Minister Shastri sanctioned the work on SNEP (Subterranean Nuclear
Explosion Project). This sanction was granted on the recommendation of Dr.
Bhabha. Prime Minister Shastri and Dr. Bhabha were very much willing to develop
nuclear weapon. They wanted to acquire same nuclear capability as a weapon test
without openly going for bomb. The zeal and speed of this project was interrupted by
the tragic deaths of Dr. Bhabha and Prime Minister Shastri. It was a big loss for the
development of Indian nuclear program. Dr. Vikram Srarabhai was the next chairman
of AEC. Dr. Sarabhai had different perspective on nuclear weapon issue with that of
Dr. Bhabha. From 1966 till 1972 India maintained nuclear option. Till this time there
was no expression of any nuclear doctrine on official and public level. There has been
a policy regarding the nuclear program since inception but this policy was not
combined with a nuclear doctrine. As a part of regional strategy Indian nuclear
program kept on developing but without an obvious and well declared nuclear
doctrine.
Phase 1974 to date (Pakistan Dimension)
In India’s nuclear history, most significant incident was happened on May 18,
1974, when India conducted its first nuclear explosions near Pokhran (India).
According to estimates these blasts were between 8-12 ki (less in power dropped on
Hiroshima in 1945). According to official statements the test was “peaceful nuclear
explosion” (PNE). In the same year Indra Gandhi had to face public unrest and she
declared unpopular emergency. Because of this emergency she lost elections in 1977.
Murarji Desai had taken charge as a new Prime Minister. His administration had
shown no zest for nuclear option as compare to the administration of Indra Gandhi.
In 1980 Indra Gandhi came back as the Prime Minister of India.
The regional scenario had considerably changed in 1980. Pakistan was well on
the route to nuclearization and Russian invasion in Afghanistan had provided a
golden chance to Pakistan to develop its nuclear weapon program successfully and
speedily.
India was not unaware of all these developments. India, in response, had used
all possible measures to contain Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program. India could not
use the norms and framework of nonproliferation and regional arms control measures
because in this case India itself had to face the reciprocal limitations and rules on the
nuclear issue. On the other hand Pakistan was frontline state in the Soviet Afghan
war. USA and China were assisting Pakistan on both economic and military fronts to
make it more capable against Soviet challenge. It was during this time that India had
given serious thoughts to prosecute a preventive war doctrine. This shows the height
of Indian frustration regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program. Such were the
circumstances and events that kept on giving shape to the future Indian nuclear
doctrine.
India, consequently adopted a preventive war/ pre- emption doctrine.
Prevention means to attack the nuclear capabilities of an opponent before it acquires
WMD. Pre-emption on the other hand, strands for the idea of attacking an opponent
before the actual use of WMD by an adversary is visible and certain. Preventive
measures are taken before the acquisition of WMD by an adversary and pre-emption
is done when WMD are acquired by an adversary and their actual use is pre- eminent.
The third term in relation with the nuclear weapon is decapitation.
134 Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, Vol. 2(1), June 2014
This option is taken for the complete destruction of adversary’s nuclear
capability including its nuclear infrastructure, command and control. Indian adoption
of such a dangerous thinking is the vivid example of its frustration about Pakistan’s
nuclear program and its failure to contain and halt this program.
Throughout the decade of 80s India kept on threatening Pakistan of
conventional preventive strikes. It was because India was well aware of its
conventional military edge over Pakistan. In 1982 US shared this information with
Pakistan that India was well in this position to carry such preventive strike. It was a
peak time of Soviet Afghan war and Pakistan was fighting as the frontline state from
US side. In such a scenario US deemed it important to equip Pakistan army with latest
F-16 aircrafts. In response to the Indian threat General Zia ul Haq gave an ambiguous
signal that in case of any preventive strike Pakistan will use all available means.
Pakistan will even use F-16 aircrafts to strike Bombay nuclear facilities and air base.
Hence the concept of preventive strike against Pakistan’s nuclear sites was refuted by
Indra Gandhi administration. It was clearly judged by the Indian military experts that
any such attack could induce retaliatory action in Pakistan and ultimately it could be
turn out as a full fledge war. Apart from US support to Pakistan, India was well aware
that Kahuta was a well defended target. India had less chances of success in such an
adventure. In this way a pre-emptive attack to destroy or seriously degrade the
adversary’s nuclear assets had finally been laid to rest. Indian nuclear doctrinal
thinking was deeply affected by this crisis. Such hostile Indian thinking enhanced the
perception of threat in Pakistan and the regional strategic scenario also became more
intense.
With these realities India entered a new turn of its nuclear doctrinal thinking.
Till this time it was an obvious fact the any kind of pre-emptive strike will earn no
gain for India. In late 80s India went for Brasstack exercises, it was an open attempt
to threaten and pressurize Pakistan. Brasstacks was the last incident when India faced
only conventionally equipped Pakistan, afterwards it was nuclear armed Pakistan
which entered in the Indian strategic calculation.
During 1990 crisis India employed heavy forces in Kashmir. There was a
considerable armed deployment on the Rajisthan in the South. During this crisis it
was nuclear factor on the side of Pakistan that put restraints on the Indian ambitions.
This crisis also ended in fear of escalation of full-fledged war, nuclear
deterrence and US mediation. All these incidents contributed in the development of
future Indian nuclear doctrine.
Indian Nuclear Doctrine
As a matter of fact Indian army was not given the task to design nuclear
doctrine till 1980s. There are several reasons behind it. At first place Indian nuclear
program was not much advanced in 80s that required a nuclear doctrine. Secondly,
Indian threat perception was not at that stage that required some doctrine. Lastly,
Indian army was not asked to formulate a doctrine not because a doctrine was not
required but also this delay was due to Indian military and strategic culture. Till late
70s and early 80s Indian nuclear program was not well acknowledged as it was in
1998, that was another reason of non formulation of nuclear doctrine.
The formulation of Indian nuclear doctrine initiated in April 1998. A task
force was set and the report of that task force was followed by Cabinet Committee on
Security, National Security Advisor and a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB).
The preparation of Indian nuclear doctrine was now the task of NSAB. NSAB
hurried its work on the draft after Kargil Crisis of 1999. On 17th August 1999 NSAB
presented its report titled ‘Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board.’ This
nuclear doctrine draft was published but it had yet to obtain the approval of
government and was made public in order to gather the public opinion. Draft Nuclear
Doctrine (DND) is a document that highligts nuclear thinking of India. It is worth
explaining that such drafts are time bound declarations and there are chances of many
changes in them with the passage of time.
India has made clear in the DND the rationale of keeping and developing
nuclear weapons. The way this rationale is presented is quite self defeating. Besides
explaining the ‘gravest threat’ to the sovereignty of India and danger to the humanity,
India reserves the right of keeping nuclear weapons. There was absolutely no need of
this wolf crying. The other important Indian stance is the rationale behind developing
nuclear technology is the economic boost of the country. Again this claim is not
absolutely true and the proof is Indian approach to acquire nuclear weapons and its
failure to meet with the complete nuclear disarmament (Spector, 1992; 63-81). The
DND also deals with the concept of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’.
136 Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, Vol. 2(1), June 2014
There is no obvious estimation of Credible Minimum Deterrence. There are
several ambiguities regarding this concept and DND describes;
“India’s peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that: (a)
any threat of use of nuclear weapon against shall invoke measures to counter the
threat: and (b) any attack on India and its armed forces shall result in punitive
retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor”
(Cheema, 2010).
Measures are not described in DND. It gives a wide range of options
including pre- emptive strikes and other conventional means. There is declaration of
Indian intention of ‘no first use of nuclear weapon.’ Historically India itself did not
accept such declaration from China. As a matter of fact, such declarations have no
credibility unless or until they are translated into a bilateral declaration.
India published an official nuclear doctrine on January 04, 2003, which was
then made public, with the following points.
1. India’s stance will be to build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent.
2. Main punch of India’s stance will be "No First Use", but these will be used
against nuclear attack, in retaliation, on territory or on its forces. This retaliation
will be massive and effect unbearable damage.
3. Civil political leadership only can authorize these retaliation attacks, naming
Nuclear Command Authority.
4. Non-nuclear states will not be hit by nuclear weapons. But, in case of major
attack (biological or chemical), India will have the option of nuclear weapons.
5. Strict control on the export of fissile material as mentioned in Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) declaration will be followed.
6. India will strictly follow the guidelines for a nuclear free world on nondiscriminatory
basis on all across the globe.
This doctrine contain for the establishment of Nuclear Command Authority
with organs of political as well as executive councils. Prime Minister will be the head
of chairs the Political Council, and this is the only body, to authorize the use of
nuclear weapons. (Rifaat Hussain, 2005, p 24)
Operationalisation of Nuclear Doctrine of India
Indian Cabinet Committee on Security reviewed this document on 4 January
2003. The principles set in DND were changed in the Operationalisation. The
principle of no first use has been modified in favor of Indian needs and necessity.
Originally this principle states that India reserves the right of using nuclear weapon in
retaliation of the opponent attack. In Operationalisation this principle was modified in
the way that if Indian forces were attacked on or outside Indian Territory, India
reserved the right of nuclear attack. The aspect of Operationalisation of this principle
leaves NFU rather ineffective when it clarifies that in case of major attack against
India, India reserves the right of using all options including biological, chemical and
nuclear weapons against the opponent (Chaudhuri, 2004; 275-280).
The DND describes ‘deterrence’ the purpose of Indian nuclear weapons. In
the Operationalisation aspect it is not explained that how and what kind of retaliation
India would show in case of any nuclear threat. DND also explains the concept of
credible minimum deterrence but the Operationalisation aspect does not include the
development of triad of strategic nuclear forces. There are long-term objectives of
these developments. Although India has put moratorium on the next nuclear
explosions but while signing Indo-US Nuclear Agreement India has retained its right
of conducting future nuclear tests. All these aspects of Operationalisation belie the
original DND statements.
Another important clause of DND is regarding the survivalabilty of the
nuclear forces. These weapons must be deployed in such way that could survive the
first use of nuclear weapons. Article 5.4 of DND describes the link between
survivalability of nuclear arsenal and C4I1 (command, control, communications,
computing and information). Survivalability depends upon the size of nuclear forces.
DND provides broad spectrum of development, deployment and employment of
nuclear forces. In Operationalisation aspect, this doctrine allows India to have
multiple redundant systems. Overall scenario prescribes unlimited space for the
nuclear development for India which again belies its other claims of peaceful use of
nuclear technology.
138 Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, Vol. 2(1), June 2014
Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program
According to Congressional Research Service, June 2012, USA, Nuclear
program of Pakistan was initiated in 1950s, but the incident that boosted it was the
loss of East Pakistan, in war against India, and the political leadership decided to start
secretly this program just after one month of this tragic incident of Bangladesh in
1972. Main attribute or primary mission of going nuclear Pakistan is the deterrence of
India’s nuclear power and also inferiority in the conventional arms with relation to
India. It was also evident that India’s “peaceful” nuclear explosion of 1974 also
worked for the urgency in this regard. Nuclear scientists of Pakistan mastered to
produce fissile material by using gas centrifuge based technology of uranium
enrichment in the years of 1980s. Fissile material for nuclear weapons is of two types,
highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Main enrichment facility of the country is
located at Kahuta including other sites. As far as sources to enrichment for these
materials it is pertinent to mention here that Pakistan acquired from many sources,
like Europe and China as well. Accordingly, Pakistan constructed a uranium
enrichment facility in the 1970s, and according to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan the
country started uranium enrichment in 1978 and highly enrichment uranium in 1983.
Officially it was stated that Pakistan is only producing only low enriched
uranium (which is not used in nuclear weapons), according to U.S. and Pakistan
government officials in 1990 in a meeting announced that the country decided to
resume producing HEU sometime after October 1989 (indicated in 1994). U.S. had
information that Pakistan is going to be a nuclear state but at what pace to a workable
experience was not clear to her. Dr. Khan stated in an interview published in May
1998 that the country had acquired the capability to explode nuclear device during
1984.2 Similarly, Dr. Khan stated in a speech (in January 2010) that Pakistan had
become a nuclear power in 1984 or 1985. Moreover, in June 1998, senior Pakistani
politicians told to parliamentary committee of Canada that Pakistan had reached the
nuclear ‘threshold’ by 1984-85. Whatsoever was the case, it was the failure of
President Bush to certify in 1990 that the country did not possess any nuclear device.
And due to this Pressler Amendment was introduced to a cut-off in military and
financial aid of Pakistan.
2 Qadeer Khan Interviewed on Pakistan N-Test,” The News, May 30, 1998.
When on May 11 and May 13, 1998 India conducted nuclear tests,
government Pakistan had to respond on May 28 and May 30 with six tests in Chaghi
(area in western Pakistan). According to seismic analysis the test yields were about 10
kilotons and 5 kilotons. (Congressional Research Service, June 2012, USA)
Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
Pakistan acquired nuclear power in order to establish a strong deterrence
against India. Initially Pakistan intended to stick with the concept of the Atom for
Peace. With passage of time and occurrence of hostile acts from Indian side Pakistan
had to change its vision. It was conventional victory of India over Pakistan when it
lost its Eastern wing at the hands of India in 1971. When India conducted its first
nuclear test in 1974, threat perception in Pakistan was on peak. Keeping in view
Indian nefarious designs against Pakistan, the leadership of Pakistan resolved to get
nuclear weapon in order to get reliable deterrence against India. Infect the same vision
is the basis of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine (Khalid, 2011; 128-136).
It is equally necessary that nuclear capability must be kept under a well devised
doctrinal concept. India announced her nuclear doctrine in August, 1999 as ‘offensive,
and threatening regional and global stability.’ (The News Rawalpindi, 1999 August 26)
Defense Committee of Cabinet, held its session under former Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif in order to devise a policy regarding Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and strategic
culture. Usually Pakistan’s policies had remained India centric mostly because of
hostile posture of the later. Pakistan’s nuclear policy has also been India centric since
1974. Bhutto described Indian nuclear tests as ‘fateful development, a threat to
Pakistan’s security’ (The Pakistan Times, 1974 June 8).
According to Smart (1975) strategic doctrine of Pakistan is based upon
following three principles that includes, first is the guarantee of independence and
geographical integrity second is mutual deterrence among nuclear states and to
control total war while third principle is “offense-defense”, as these weapons made it
possible for weaker states to defend themselves effectively against aggressors and
powerful countries. These perceived security and deterrence benefits underpin
Islamabad’s to stay away from the policy of no first use. According to most
authoritative sources Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is based on the following claims:-
140 Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, Vol. 2(1), June 2014
1. Nuclear weapons are assurance for the territorial integrity of the country as well
as national independence and sovereignty.
2. Pakistani threat perceptions (as narrated above) are only India-centric and sole
aim to having these weapons is to deter India from aggression. Such as,
• Nuclear weapons are essential for India’s conventional superiority.
• As conventional balance of forces between India and Pakistan, benefitted India
so nuclear use is for Balance of Power in conventional force ratios between the
two sides.
3. Deterrence strategy of Pakistan is based on threat of punishment with counter
value targets.
4. Pakistan’s strategic stance is that of minimum credible deterrence, it is minimum
because as these weapons have no other role but to deter the adversary.
5. As India has advantage in conventional army, so Pakistan cannot commit to a
policy of no first use (NFU). As this will enable India to fight conventional war
with impunity.
6. The National Command Authority (NCA), comprising the Employment Control
Committee, Development Control Committee and Strategic Plans Division, is
the center point of all decision-making regarding nuclear issue.
7. Nuclear assets are considered to be safe, secure and almost free from risks of
improper or accidental use.
These were the main attributes of the Pakistan’s undeclared nuclear doctrine.
It has three distinct policy objectives: a) deter a first nuclear use by India; b) enable
Pakistan to deter Indian conventional attack; c) allow Islamabad to “internationalize
the crisis and invite outside intervention in the unfavorable circumstance”– the
external balancing factor. Some analysts have suggested that this capability may also
be used as deterrent to cover a low-intensity war in Kashmir (Rifaat Hussain, 2005)
Pakistan principally decided to adopt the option of ‘Credible Minimum
Deterrence’ (The News, 1999 August 26). This concept had remained central to all
nuclear policy and planning of Pakistan.
Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence
Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence has remained a principle option of
Pakistan’s nuclear policy. Many Pakistani decision makers have referred to this policy
at many occasions.
This principle underlines an understood notion that Pakistan’s nuclear policy
is mainly India centric. Nuclear capability is required only to the extent that could
ensure nuclear deterrence against Indian unscrupulous posture as the country had
experienced in 1971 (The News, 1999 August 26).
Pakistan has maintained only that much nuclear force that would be enough
to inflict unacceptable damage to India in case if the later intend to jeopardize the
security of the former. During the crisis situation after overt nuclearization, Pakistan
had clearly signaled India of nuclear deterrence and certainly this fact had contained
India in Kargil crisis and military confrontation of 2002 (Chakma, 2009, p.127).
Pakistan had refrained from the term of nuclear weapons in these confrontations
instead the term of ‘unconventional weapons’ or ‘unconventional war’ is used by the
authorities (The News, 2002 May 30).
CMD confirms Pakistan’s disinterest in any kind of nuclear arms race in the
region. In November, 1999 Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar stated while
addressing in a conference, ‘more is unnecessary while little is enough’ (The Muslim,
1999 November 28). At the same time he made it clear that it is required to upgrade
and update nuclear technology in order to maintain meaningful deterrence (The
Dawn 1999 November 25). In 2003 General Pervaiz Musharraf also stated that
number did not matter ‘beyond a point.’ He further stated that Pakistan has acquired
sufficient deterrence to take care of her security (The Hindu 2003 Mach 7).
Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons
Command and control system of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is comprised of
NCA (National Command Authority) and SPD (Strategic Plans Division) which work
under the command of NCA. Hence, a compact and coherent system was developed
for the command and control of the strategic assets. All components of the command
and control system have well defined roles and responsibilities to perform.
National Command Authority (NCA)
After nuclear explosion Pakistan had devised a well conceived and elaborated
system of C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence). This system
remained informal till 1999.
Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, Vol. 2(1), June 2014
In February, 2000 a formal system of command and control was established
by the Government. The purpose of NCA is development and deployment of the
nuclear weapons. This organization is comprised of highest decision makers from
politics and military leadership. This organization centrally controls all aspects of
development and deployment matters of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons (Ramdas, 2001).
Employment Control Committee (ECC)
This committee is given the task of gathering latest information on threats to
the national authority, strategic weapons program and deployment of weapons
programs. It retains its authority in both peace and war time. In the time of peace this
committee makes appropriate approvals for the development and in the time of war it
has full authority to control and deploy the tri-services strategic forces. This
committee contains both military and military leadership. This committee has eleven
members. In case of requirement, professional experts may be invited. The President
of Pakistan is the chairman of this committee while prime minister is the vice
chairman and deputy chairman is the foreign minister of Pakistan. Its members
include federal ministers of defense, finance and interior, the CJCSC, three service
chiefs. DG SPD is as member secretary (Albright, 2001).
This set-up is devised in order to make sure the involvement of both political
and military leadership in the process of vital decision making.
Development Control Committee (DCC)
It is a military-scientific committee. Main function of this committee is the
preparation and up-gradation of nuclear capabilities in order to keep deterrent
capability in a ready and vigorous form. This function is being performed since 1998.
President of Pakistan is the chairman of this committee and prime minister is the vice
chairman while the CJCSC is the deputy chairman of DCC. This committee has the
same members as ECC. The only difference in this committee is the affiliation of
atomic bureaucracy. Head of KRL, chairman PAEC and chairman of National
Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) are the members of this
committee (Bowen & Wolven, 1999). Main tasks of this committee include the
formation of administrative policy about the development of nuclear weapons, missile
system, related infra structure and technologies. Another important function of this
committee is to determine the size of Pakistani deterrence.
It is also responsible for the credibility and readiness of the nuclear arsenals
(Ramusino & Martellinni, 2001, p.20, The Dawn 2003 January 7). The working of this
committee has great significance as far as nuclear program of Pakistan is concerned.
Strategic Plan Division (SPD)
This is a very important organization which performs multiple tasks of great
significance. It serves as secretariat of NCA. Its tasks include planning, development
of weapons, arms control, disarmament affairs, command and control, storage, safety
budget etc. It covers all dimensions of development and management of Pakistan’s
nuclear capability. It performs all tasks of great importance on the behalf of NCA.
SPD is directly under the President, prime minister and CJCSC, while DG SPD is the
head of this organization. Almost seventy officers from three services are included in
SPD (Bowen & Wolven, 1999). They had wide range of structural and institutional
functions to perform.
Specific Functions of SPD
SPD performs multiple tasks regarding nuclear capability. The specific tasks
that it performs on the behalf of NCA are following;
i) Formulation of nuclear policy, strategy and doctrines.
ii) Formulation of long and short term force development strategy. This strategy is
devised for all tri-services strategic forces. Power potential of the state and
current arms control regime is taken under consideration while formulating
these policies. Check on the proper implementation is also the responsibility of
SPD.
iii) Formulation of plans for the movement, deployment and employment of
strategic forces.
iv) Devising measures for the long and short term safety and security of the
strategic assets.
v) To assist the president, prime minister and CJCSC in the exercise of control
over strategic organizations. It also takes-up the duty of coordinating the
financial, technical, developmental and administrative aspect of the strategic
assets.
Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, Vol. 2(1), June 2014
vi) Coordinating and ensuring C4I2SR (Command, Control, Communication,
Computerization and Surveillance and Reconnaissance) system for NCA (The
Business Recorder 2007 December 14).
Personnel and Transportation Security Measures
Pakistan has devised an elaborate personnel and transportation security
mechanism. This is called PRP/HRP (The Personnel and Human Reliability
Programs). These arrangements are made to counter the threat to nuclear arsenals in
meaningful ways. The scrutiny of all personal involved in the safety, security and
deployment of nuclear material is included in it. All the personnel involved in the
nuclear security arrangements have to undergo rigorous screening program (Luongo
& Salik, 2007, p.15-17, Khan, 2003). Their backgrounds are checked, their contacts
and traveling and communication is kept under strict surveillance. Beside this there is
an extensive procedure of psychological screening as well.
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
PNRA was established in December, 2001. PNRA is basically responsible for
the safety and security of the peaceful aspect of Pakistan’s nuclear program. PNRA
developed criteria and checklists for the maintenance of the highest standards of
security measures for nuclear weapons. PNRA had taken great advantage and benefits
from IAEA sponsored workshops and seminars on the issues like Designed Based
Threat (DBT). PNRA invited IAEA experts to review its activities. It has also shared
its reports with IAEA in order to enhance the level of expertise in this field. (Irum, K.
2012)
A five year plan on National Nuclear Safety is also developed by NPRA which
had undergone the necessary funding by the government. This program included the
training of personnel involved in emergency rescues in case of the release of radiation.
All these measures are taken in order to ensure a reliable security of nuclear and
radioactive material in order to avoid unauthentic use (Luongo & Salik, 2007,
Cheema, 2010, p.189).
Amir Latif 145
Pakistan - India Nuclear Postures and its Implication on South Asia
South Asian region consists of SAARC members. Pakistan and India are the
paramount states of the region. The entire politics of region revolves around these
two states. After nuclearization the responsibility of both states has enhanced in the
region. Both states have devised their nuclear doctrines. These doctrines established a
reliable deterrence in the region. There are many significant steps that are emanated
out of these doctrines. (Irum, K. 2012).
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Bowen, C.B. & Wolven, D. (2001). Command and control challenges in South Asia. The Non
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Chakma, B. (2009). Pakistan’s Nuclear weapons. London: Routledge.
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